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760 395 Mass. 757
<br />AAXx v. Iprca.
<br />'lite Court of Appeals determined that the town raised argu-
<br />ments of sufficient weight to make uncertain the proper in-
<br />terpretation of the statutory language in question and that au-
<br />thoritative resolution of that uncertainty would significantly
<br />affect the way in which it ought to decide the appeal before
<br />it. We proceed to address the three certified questions.
<br />(1) Does the word "recording," as it appears in the first
<br />sentence of the fourth paragraph of G. L. c. 40A, 4 6, neces-
<br />sarily refer to the recording of a "plan"?'
<br />We begin our answers by observing that "Iblarrenness of
<br />accomplishment is not lightly to be imputed to the legislative
<br />branch of the government." Selectmen of Topsf)eld v. State
<br />Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 314 (1949). See Insurance
<br />Raring Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 189
<br />(1969). Nor do we interpret a statute so as to render it or any
<br />portion of it meaningless. See Casa Loma, Inc. v. Alcoholic
<br />Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 231, 234 (1979). The
<br />construction of a statute which leads to a determination that a
<br />piece of legislation is ineffective will not be adopted if the
<br />statutory language "is fairly susceptible to a construction that
<br />would lead to a logical and sensible result." Lexington v. Bed-
<br />ford, 378 Mass. 562, 570 (1979), quoting Bell v. Treasurer
<br />of Cambridge, 310 Mass. 484, 489 (1941). McCarthy v.
<br />Woburn Hour. Auth., 341 Mass. 539, 542 (1960). Berube v.
<br />Selectmen of £dgarrown, 336 Mass. 634, 639 (1958).
<br />The first sentence of the fourth paragraph of G. L. c. 40A,
<br />4 6, exempts certain lots from increased zoning restrictions if,
<br />among other conditions, the lot "at the time of recording or
<br />endorsement, whicheveroccurs sooner was not held incommon
<br />ownership with any adjoining land." In Sieber v. Gauthier,
<br />'Gencnl Laws c. 4OA, j 6, fount par., 1st sentence ( 1984 ed.), provides:
<br />-Any increase in arca, frontage, width, yard, or depth requirements of a
<br />ginning ordinance or by-law Mall not apply to a lot for single and two-family
<br />residential use which or the time of recording or endorsement, whichever
<br />occurs soamr was not held in common ownership with any adjoining land.
<br />conformed to then e.isting requirements and had less than the proposed
<br />requirenem but at least rive thousand square feet of area and fifty feet of
<br />Inuuagc' (emphasis added).
<br />"•
<br />395 Mass. 757 ✓• 761
<br />'
<br />Ad o ics r. ipawkh. -
<br />r
<br />the judge of the Superior Court rejected the town of Wellflcet' ••
<br />'
<br />argument that in that sentence the word "recording" nccessarik,
<br />refers to the recording of a plan. In the instant case neither
<br />party has argued that the word "recording" refers only to .
<br />plan. The town of Ipswich lakes the position that "the word•
<br />'recording or endorsement whichever occurs sooner' ... refer
<br />to the earliest recorded instrument showing a lot as an idents.
<br />fiable separate entity" (emphasis added), and throughout its
<br />brief, the town refers to a plan or a deed. The town thus doe,
<br />not rest its argument on the necessity of the word "recording"
<br />referring only to the recording of a plan. Generally an issue
<br />not argued is deemed waived. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4).
<br />as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). We nonetheless respond
<br />to the first question posed by the Court of Appeals.
<br />The Superior Court judge in Sieber v. Gauthier concluded
<br />that the first sentence of the fourth paragraph of 9 6 does not
<br />necessarily refer to the recording of a plan, but rather, refers
<br />t,
<br />to the recording of any instrument, including a deed. We agree.
<br />General Laws c. 4, $ 7 (1984 defines "recorded"
<br />ed.), as
<br />applying to "plans, deeds or other instruments affecting land."
<br />That section also provides that defined words "shall have the
<br />meaning herein given, unless a contrary intention clearly ap-
<br />pears." Id. Because it is only after the plan is recorded that
<br />the lots are sold and deeds given to separate owners, see G. L.
<br />c. 183, ii 6A (1984 ed.), we also conclude that the sentence
<br />at issue means the recording of any instrument, including a
<br />deed.'
<br />• In his thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum, the Superior Court
<br />J
<br />udge in Sieber v. Gauthier reasoned as follows: "A subdivision as n 1%
<br />defined by G. L. e. 41, 6 OIL, is the 'division of a tract of land into two
<br />or more las.' Before the Subdivision Control Law took effect. such a
<br />division could be accomplished without review by local planning boards
<br />simply by recording a survey plan showing the newly crested lots. Regardless
<br />of whether a subdivision plan was made before or after the Subdivision
<br />Control Law became effective, Implicit In all such plans is the understanding
<br />that potential new lines of ownership are created in a tract of land so divided.
<br />There is no point in creating a plan of las already separately conveyed.
<br />To interpret Section 6 to require separate ownership at dee time of recording
<br />or endorsement of a plan showing more than one lot is to render it meaning-
<br />
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