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2/25/2013 BOARD OF SELECTMEN Minutes
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2/25/2013 BOARD OF SELECTMEN Minutes
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Mashpee_Meeting Documents
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BOARD OF SELECTMEN
Meeting Document Type
Minutes
Meeting Date
02/25/2013
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down by meeting but not exceeding the with the dollar value of the lives that 21. 7beNRCsbould requireplantowners <br /> current standards. would potentially be saved. However, to calculate the risk offuel damage in <br /> the results of these analyses are skewed spent fuel pools as well as reactor cores <br /> 18. 7be NRC should require new reactor because the NRC uses a much lower fig- in all safety analyses. <br /> designs to be safer than existing reactors. ure for the value of a human life than the Reactor owners' cost-benefit analyses of <br /> In 1986,the NRC issued a policy requir- safety problems do not consider the risks <br /> ing advanced reactors to provide merely of damage to fuel in spent fuel pools,yet <br /> the same level of protection as existing In the absence of the pools'cooling systems are often cou- <br /> reactors.Instead,any new reactors should pled to other plant systems. By ignoring <br /> have additional features designed to stronger safety and these risks,reactor owners underestimate <br /> prevent severe accidents, to mitigate asecurity standards,the the potential costs of some types of severe <br /> severe accident if one should occur, and accidents. <br /> to reduce reliance on operator interven- industry will keep its <br /> tions during an accident (which are costs down by meeting 22' The NRC should not make decisions <br /> inherently less dependable than built-in about reactor safety using probabilistic <br /> measures). but not exceeding the risk assessments(PRAs)until it has cor- <br /> For example,a containment building rected its flawed application of this tool. <br /> designed to withstand the high pressures current standards. PRAs, which the NRC and the nuclear <br /> that can occur in a severe accident de- industry use for a variety of purposes,can <br /> creases the risk of radiation escaping into be a valuable tool when used appropri- <br /> the environment.Yet some reactor types rest of the U.S. government. Moreover, ately.13 For example, because inspecting <br /> do not have such containment buildings these analyses only account for potential every inch of pipe in a nuclear plant is <br /> and therefore require electrically powered damage to fuel in the reactor,not in spent not feasible, PRAs can determine which <br /> systems such as hydrogen igniters to fuel pools. portions of pipe have the greatest risk of <br /> maintain the building's structural integ- 'There are also serious problems with failure or would cause the most damage <br /> riry. Moreover, the trend in new reactor the way the NRC uses probabilistic analy- if a failure occurred,and should therefore <br /> designs is to reduce the size and strength ses to assess the risks of different types of receive priority during inspections.PRAs <br /> of containment buildings. accidents, which may have the effect of are also used to assess the possibility that <br /> underestimating the actual risks. For ex- multiple safety systems might fail and <br /> 19. 7be NRC should require new read- ample, the agency's analyses do not fully cause a reactor meltdown. <br /> for designs to be more secure against account for the risks of earthquakes and However, UCS, the Government <br /> land-and water-based terrorist attacks. extreme weather. Accountability Office, the NRC inspec- <br /> Nine years after 9/11,the NRC required for general,the NRC Advisory Commit- <br /> new reactor designs to incorporate fea- 20. The NRC should increase the value tee on Reactor Safeguards,and the NRC <br /> tures that would enhance the reactor's it assigns to a human life in its cost- itself have all documented serious prob- <br /> ability to withstand an airplane attack, benefit analyses so the value is consistent lems with the agency's PRAs, including <br /> either by maintaining the structural in- with other government agencies. omission of key data, inconsistent as- <br /> tegriry of the containment building and U.S. agencies other than the NRC place sumptions and methodology, and inad- <br /> spent fuel pool or by maintaining cool- a value on a human life of between equate quality standards. For example, <br /> ing of the core and spent fuel pool if $5 million and$9 million. The NRC— the NRC does not require that PRAs in- <br /> structural integrity is lost. But the NRC despite the Office of Management and clude a rigorous evaluation of seismic <br /> rejected a proposal that would also require Budget's recent warning that it would be risks, even though earthquakes may be <br /> features designed to reduce vulnerability difficult to justify a value below $5 mil- one of the biggest potential contributors <br /> to land- and water-based attacks. All lion—has continued to value a human to core damage. <br /> potential modes of attack need to be life at$3 million since 1995.' To be valid,PRAs must include all in- <br /> addressed. Bringing the NRC's calculations in ternal and external events that could lead <br /> line with other agencies would have a to an accident. They must address all <br /> Improving the NRC's Cost-Benefit major effect on nuclear plant license re- modes of operation(including shutdown <br /> and Risk-Informed Analyses newals and new reactor approvals: plant and low-power modes), incorporate rig- <br /> In deciding whether to require reactor owners would have to add safety features orous uncertainty analyses, and meet <br /> owners to undertake a safety retrofit,the that the NRC now considers too expen- strict quality assurance standards. The <br /> NRC often conducts a cost-benefit analy- sive (because it underestimates the value NRC must also account for a wider range <br /> sis that compares the costs of the retrofit of the lives that could be saved). of potential accident consequences by <br /> U.S. NUCLEAR POWER AFTER FUKUSNIMA 11 <br />
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