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2/25/2013 BOARD OF SELECTMEN Minutes
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2/25/2013 BOARD OF SELECTMEN Minutes
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Mashpee_Meeting Documents
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BOARD OF SELECTMEN
Meeting Document Type
Minutes
Meeting Date
02/25/2013
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I <br /> addressing severe accidents.For example, Set Timeliness Goals for Safety Issues <br /> the agency does not evaluate or test the The safety and security 7be NRC should apply the same type <br /> severe accident management guidelines of timeliness goals to nuclearplant <br /> that reactor owners have voluntarily de- risks associated with safety that it does for business-related <br /> veloped, so neither the NRC nor the spent fuel would be requests from reactor owners. <br /> public can be confident these guidelines The NRC has established goals for com- <br /> would be effective. Extending NRC re- reduced by transferring pleting business dealings in a timely man- <br /> quirements,inspections,and enforcement the fuel from pools to ner, but has not done so for resolving <br /> to cover a wide range of severe accident outstanding safety issues.By treating safe- <br /> conditions would ensure that effective dry casks once it is cool rywith the same urgency it gives to busi- <br /> plans and the equipment needed to deal ness dealings,the agency can provide the <br /> with such accidents are put in place. (See enough. robust, timely oversight that is needed. <br /> recommendation 1 below.) (See recommendation 8 below.) <br /> Strengthen Emergency Planning Improve Protection against <br /> Requirements densely packed than those at Fukushima Terrorist Attacks <br /> 7be NRC should ensure that everyone and pose even greater hazards. The NRC should make more realistic <br /> at significant risk from a severe acci- The safety and security risks associated assumptions about the capabilities of <br /> dent—notjustpeople within the arbi- with spent fuel would be reduced by terrorists who might attack a nuclear <br /> trary 10-mile zone currently used for transferring the fuel from pools to dry powerplant, and these assumptions <br /> emergency planning—is protected casks once it is cool enough(i.e.,five years should be reviewed by U.S. intelligence <br /> In the United States,emergency planning after removal from the reactor).With less agencies. <br /> for a nuclear reactor accident is limited fuel in the pools, the remaining fuel Current assumptions about potential <br /> to a 10-mile radius around the reactor. would be easier to keep cool if power is attackers are unrealistically modest and do <br /> Yet the U.S.government advised Ameri- lost,and less radiation would be released not reflect real-world threats.For example, <br /> cans within SO miles of the Fukushima in the event of an accident or terrorist they may ignore the possibility that ter- <br /> Daiichi reactors to evacuate—a decision attack. However, because dry casks are rorist groups could use rocket-propelled <br /> validated by the high contamination expensive,reactor owners have chosen to grenades—a weapon widely used by in- <br /> levels recorded well beyond 10 miles from fill their pools to maximum capacity,and surgents around the world. New as- <br /> the plant. A severe accident at a U.S. the NRC has not required owners to sumptions developed by the NRC <br /> reactor could similarly require the evacu- transfer their spent fuel to dry casks. (See should be reviewed by an interagency <br /> ation of people outside the 10-mile plan- recommendation 4 below.) body that includes the intelligence com- <br /> ning zone and other protective measures munity, the National Nuclear Security <br /> to avoid high radiation exposures.The NRC Enforce Fire Protection Regulations Administration, and the Department of <br /> should therefore require reactor owners 7be NRC should compel the owners Homeland Security. (See recommenda- <br /> to develop emergency plans for a larger of more than three dozen reactors to tion 15 below.) <br /> area, based on a scientific assessment of comply with fire protection regulations <br /> the populations at risk for each reactor they currently violate. Strengthen Safety Standards for <br /> site. (See recommendation 3 below.) Because a fire can disable both primary New Reactor Designs <br /> and backup emergency systems, it is a The NRC should require any new <br /> Move Spent Fuel to Dry Casks leading risk factor for reactor core dam- reactors to be safer than existing reactors. <br /> The NRC should require plant owners to age. Following a 1975 fire at the Browns Current policy only requires advanced <br /> transfer fuel from storage pools to dry casks Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama,the NRC reactors to provide the same level of pro- <br /> when the fuelhas cooled enough to do so. issued regulations in 1980 intended to tection as existing reactors—most of <br /> _ The Fukushima crisis illustrated the dan- reduce the fire hazard at all reactors, and which were built at least 30 years ago.To <br /> gers of keeping spent fuel in storage pools it amended those regulations in 2004 to ensure that any new nuclear plant is sig- <br /> when the plant lost power needed to cool provide an alternative option for compli- nificantly safer than existing ones, the <br /> its pools. It is still unclear whether cool- ance. However, more than three dozen NRC should require features designed to <br /> ing was resumed in time to prevent the reactors still do not comply with these prevent severe accidents and to mitigate <br /> spent fuel from overheating and melting, fire protection regulations,and their own- such an accident if one occurs. (See rec- <br /> and releasing radiation. However, the ers have made no firm commitments to ommendation 18 below.) <br /> spent fuel pools at U.S. reactors could comply anytime soon.(See recommenda- <br /> have fared worse,since they are far more tion 7 below.) <br /> hI <br /> N U.S. NUCLEAR POWER AFTER FUKUSHIMA 3 <br />
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