2/25/2013 BOARD OF SELECTMEN Minutes

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I Assign an Appropriate Value to must give a higher priority to such mea- the direct cause was the loss of both off- Human Life in Cost-Benefit Analyses sures. Specifically: site and on-site AC power—a situation The NRC should increase the value of known as a station blackout—leaving human life in its analyses so it is concis- 1. the NRC should extend the scope only DC power from batteries available. tent with other government agencies. of regulations to include the prevention The Atomic Energy Commission (the The NRC currently uses a dollar value for and mitigation ofsevere accidents. NRC's predecessor)proposed regulations a human life that is only one-half to one- NRC regulations are focused on design- third the value used by other agencies. basis accidents and for the most part do Bringing that value in line would have a not address severe accidents.For example, Most measures designed major effect on nuclear plant license re- because NRC regulations do not require to prevent and mitigate newals and new reactor approvals: plant reactor owners to develop severe accident owners would have to add safety features management guidelines,the agency does severe accidents are that the NRC now considers too expen- not evaluate or test guidelines that own- sive (because it underestimates the value ers have developed voluntarily.As a con- voluntary.The accident of the lives that could be saved). (See rec- sequence,neither the NRC nor the public at Fukushima has shown ommendation 20 below.) can be confident such guidelines would be effective. that the NRC must give All Recommendations The NRC requires reactor owners to have plans to cope with the loss of large a higher priority to such in Detail areas of a plant due to explosion and fire, measures. Preventing and Mitigating the such as would result from an aircraft Effects of Severe Accidents attack. However, these plans would not The NRC considers some accidents likely generally protect reactors against any to address station blackouts as early as enough that a nuclear reactor cannot be severe accident—since the equipment or 1974 but the nuclear industry opposed licensed unless it has been designed the area in which it is stored may not be those requirements, contending that a to withstand them; these are termed designed to withstand an earthquake or station blackout simply could not hap- "design-basis" accidents.The worst such other natural disaster. pen.The NRC finally issued a regulation accident—as defined by the NRC— Plant owners and the NRC need to in 1988 aimed at minimizing this risk; involves the partial melting of the fuel in re-evaluate these plans in light of Fuku- nevertheless, the Uogtle nuclear plant in the reactor core, but not the rupture of shima to judge whether they are realistic. Georgia experienced a station blackout the reactor vessel or large releases of ra- In particular, high levels of radioactive less than two years later. diation from the containment building. contamination may make it impossible The NRC requires U.S.plants to have Yet reactors that can withstand design- for workers to access key equipment or astrategyforcoping with astation black- basis accidents are still vulnerable to vital areas of the plant.Both parties must up t f oo 16 hours, assuming that "beyond-design-basis" or "severe" acci- also determine how to safely manage any ov<ut ut s will o able to restore reliable AC dents, which the NRC considers so un- contaminated water if normal cooling is power within this time. In developing likely that reactors need not be able to lost and the reactor cores and spent fuel this requirement, the NRC ignored the withstand them. pools need to be manually cooled with possibility of events—such as severe While severe accidents are less likely outside water. earthquakes—that could disrupt a plant's than design-basis accidents, they are still Extending NRC requirements,inspec- surrounding infrastructure for an extend- feasible and could result from a wide tions, and enforcement to cover a wide ed period,as was the case at Fukushima. r variety of events, including an extended range of severe accident conditions would Reactor owners should instead be re- loss of power, fire, or natural disaster, ensure that effective plans and the equip- power remains to handle events in which AC unavaitable for a longer 4 A severe accident (such as that at Fuku- ment needed to deal with such accidents iil shima) will result in substantial damage are put in place. period of time, and which both AC to the reactor core fuel and could result in failure of the containment building, 2. The NRC should require reactor and DC power are unavailable. leading to large releases of radiation. owners to develop and test emergency 3. The NRC should modify emergency Because the NRC has addressed severe procedures for situations when no AC planning requirements to ensure that accident issues on an ad hoc basis, most or DCpower is available for an everyone at significant risk from a severe measures designed to prevent and miti- extendedperiod. accident—notjustpeople within the gate them are voluntary.The accident at While the Fukushima accident was pre- arbitrary 10-mile planning wne— Fukushima has shown that the NRC cipitated by an earthquake and tsunami, is protected. 4 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS